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Abstract 
 
IEEE 802.1X is a key part of 
IEEE802.11i. By employing EAP it 
supports a variety of upper layer 
authentication methods each with 
different benefits and drawbacks. Any 
one of these authentication methods 
can be the ideal choice for a specific 
networking environment. The fact that 
IEEE 802.11i leaves the selection of 
the most suitable authentication 
method to system implementers makes 
the authentication framework more 
flexible but on the other hand leads to 
the question of how to select the 
authentication method that suits an 
organisation’s requirements and 
specific networking environment. This 
paper gives an overview of EAP 
authentication methods and provides a 
table comparing their properties. It 
then identifies the crucial factors to be 
considered when employing EAP 
authentication methods in WLAN 
environments. The paper presents 
algorithms that guide the selection of 
an EAP-authentication method for a 
WLAN and demonstrates their 
application through three examples. 
 
Keywords: IEEE 802.1X, EAP, LEAP, 
MD5, PEAP, PKI, RADIUS, TLS, 
TTLS. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The IEEE 802.1X authentication 
framework was originally designed for 
wired networks but due to the flaws 
and vulnerabilities in the 
authentication schemes proposed in the 
original IEEE 802.11 standard, IEEE 
802.1X was revised for use on wireless 
networks. (Shumman and Ran, 2003). 
IEEE 802.1X is very simple in concept. 
Its purpose is to implement access 
control at the point at which a user 
joins the network. The main point of 
providing port security is to protect 
network connections where these 
connections might be accessible in a 
non-secure area. The reason why IEEE 
802.1X is so appropriate for IEEE 
802.11 networks. (Edney, J and 
Arbaugh, W., 2004) is that the nature 
of wireless LANs makes almost all 
links publicly accessible. 
IEEE 802.1X divides the network 
universe into three entities: 
1) Supplicant, which wants to join the 
network. 
2) Authenticator, which controls 
access. 
3) Authentication server, which 
makes authentication decisions. 
To accomplish its goals IEEE 802.1X 
utilises well-known protocols such as 
EAP and RADIUS. Due to the range of 
different applications for WLANs, a 
single authentication method could not 
be suitable in all cases. 
The IEEE 802.11 standard cannot and 
does not define the upper layer 
authentication method (by being upper 
layer the authentication method falls 
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outside the scope of LAN protocol 
standards), and instead leaves it to the 
implementers of the system to decide 
which authentication method to use.  
Given the number of authentication 
methods that could be supported by 
EAP, the question arises, which one is 
the best one to use? There is no simple 
answer; each method can be an ideal 
choice for a specific networking 
environment.  
This paper identifies factors upon 
which the selection decision will 
depend and based on these factors the 
paper presents algorithms that guide 
the selection of the most suitable EAP-
authentication method.  
The paper is organised as follows: In 
section 2 an overview is provided of 
the EAP protocol. In section 3 the most 
common EAP authentication methods 
are presented. In section 4 factors to be 
considered when selecting the most 
suitable authentication method for a 
particular WLAN environment are 
identified. In section 5 algorithms that 
guide the selection of an EAP 
authentication method are presented. In 
section 6 examples of the application 
of the selection algorithms are 
provided. In section 7 managerial 
implications of ensuring the chosen 
authentication method maintains the 
required level of protection are 
discussed. The paper is concluded in 
section 8. 
  
2. EAP 
IEEE 802.1X, which provides an 
authentication framework, employs 
extensible authentication protocol 
(EAP) to support various 
authentication methods. 
EAP is a protocol that defines how to 
carry out authentication, but it is the 
EAP methods such as TLS, PEAP, 
LEAP, TTLS, and so forth that 
actually determine the answer to the 
question, are you really who you say 
you are? in the network authentication 
process. 
EAP is a general protocol for PPP 
authentication and is built around the 
challenge/response communication 
paradigm. (Ma and Cao, 2003). EAP 
does not select a specific 
authentication method at the link 
control phase, but rather postpones this 
decision until the authentication phase. 
This allows the authenticator (access 
point) to request more information 
before determining the specific 
authentication method. The EAP 
authentication process can be 
summarised as follows: 
• The authenticator sends one or more 
requests to authenticate the 
supplicant. The request message has 
a type field to indicate what is being 
requested. 
• The supplicant responds to each 
request.   The type field of the 
response message must correspond to 
that of the request message.  
• After multiple exchanges of 
request/response messages, the 
authenticator ends the authentication 
phase with a success or failure 
message. 
EAP messages do not have an 
addressing mechanism and are 
transmitted as EAPOL protocol 
between the supplicant and the 
authenticator, and are carried as a 
RADIUS attribute between the 
authenticator and the authentication 
server (RADIUS) (Mishra and Ho, 
2004). 
 
3. EAP Authentication Methods 
As mentioned earlier IEEE 802.1X by 
employing EAP supports a variety of 
authentication methods with different 
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benefits and drawbacks. This section 
provides an overview of the most 
common EAP authentication methods, 
and compares their properties and 
security attributes in table 1. 
For all these reasons MD5 is not 
recommended to be used as an 
authentication method in WLANs. 
 MD5: Message digest 5 (MD5) is a 
challenge-based unilateral 
authentication mechanism. As with any 
other authentication scheme that uses a 
random challenge combined with a 
password and hash algorithm, it is 
open to a dictionary attack. There are 
three main reasons that MD5 is an 
inappropriate wireless authentication 
algorithm: 
 LEAP: LEAP is Cisco’s lightweight 
EAP, which is widely deployed in 
today’s WLANs. (Cisco Systems, 
2003). 
With this method, the RADIUS server 
sends an authentication challenge to 
the client, the client uses a one-way 
hash of the user-supplied password to 
fashion a response to the RADIUS 
server. Using information from its user 
database, the RADIUS server creates it 
is own response and compares that to 
the response from the client. When the 
RADIUS server authenticates the 
client, the process repeats in reverse, 
enabling the client to authenticate the 
RADIUS server. After the completion 
of this process, an EAP success/failure 
message is sent to the client and both 
the RADIUS server and the client 
derive the dynamic WEP key.    
Firstly, MD5 requires that the user 
password be stored in a way that lets 
the authenticator get at the original 
plain text password. This opens up the 
possibility of an entity other than the 
authentication server getting access to 
the file of passwords. 
Secondly, MD5 only authenticates the 
supplicant. It does nothing to 
authenticate the authentication server, 
the RADIUS server. Since wireless is 
especially vulnerable to impersonation, 
this is a major problem. Whereas 
impersonating a dial-up access server 
on the other end of a phone line is 
fairly difficult, impersonating a 
wireless access server just means 
getting within a couple hundred feet of 
the supplicant. This lack of mutual 
authentication is the basic reason why 
some wireless vendors have chosen not 
to allow MD5 as an authentication 
option for WLANs. 
LEAP’s use of unencrypted challenges 
and responses does leave it open to 
online (active) and offline (passive) 
dictionary attacks. Active dictionary 
attacks can be prevented using lockout 
mechanisms available on RADIUS 
servers to lockout the user after a 
certain number of invalid login 
attempts. An offline dictionary attack 
such as that using a tool that was 
introduced at Unstrung’s live event in 
New York (Cisco Systems, 2003) is 
carried out in two phases to uncover 
the user’s password. In the first phase, 
the attacker captures the 
challenge/response messages 
exchanged between the user and the 
access point. In the second phase, the 
attacker looks for a password match by 
computing a list of possible 
challenge/response messages using a 
pre-computed dictionary and 
comparing these messages against the 
captured challenge/response messages. 
The attacker uses known 
Thirdly, MD5 does not create a WEP 
session key, ideally, immediately after 
authentication, the wireless client and 
access point jump into WEP-encrypted 
communications, which reduces the 
risks of eavesdropping, impersonation, 
or data corruption by a hostile attacker. 
This problem limits its usefulness in 
the wireless world. 
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authentication protocol vulnerabilities 
to reduce the size of the user password 
dictionary (Cisco Systems, 2004). 
Using a strong password policy and 
periodically expiring passwords 
significantly reduces an offline attack 
tools chances of success. Unlike online 
attacks, offline attacks are not easily 
detected. With Cisco’s LEAP, security 
keys change dynamically with every 
communication session, preventing an 
attacker from collecting the packets 
required to decode data. (Cisco 
Systems, 2002). 
 TLS: Transport layer security (TLS) 
protocol is based on SSL v3.0, which 
is used in most web browsers for 
secure web transactions. SSL was 
developed by the Netscape 
Communications Corporation in 1994 
(Cisco Systems, 2003) to secure 
transactions over the World Wide Web. 
Soon after, the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF) began work to 
develop a standard protocol that 
provided the same functionality. They 
used SSL 3.0 as the basis for that work, 
which became the TLS v1.0 protocol.  
TLS provides a very secure mutual 
authentication protocol that overcomes 
the shortcomings of the password-
based and challenge-based methods.  
TLS uses public key certificates to 
authenticate both the wireless clients 
and the RADIUS servers by 
establishing an encrypted TLS session 
between the two communicating 
parties. 
The TLS protocol is composed of two 
layers: the TLS record protocol and the 
TLS handshake protocol (Ma and Cao, 
2003). 
The TLS record protocol provides 
connection security that has two basic 
properties: 
1. The connection is private. 
Symmetric key cryptography is 
used for data encryption. The keys 
for this symmetric encryption are 
generated uniquely for each 
connection and are based on a 
secret negotiated by another 
protocol such as TLS handshake 
protocol. The record protocol can 
also be used without encryption. 
2. The connection is reliable. The 
message transport includes a 
message integrity check using a 
keyed MAC. Secure hash functions 
are used for MAC computations. 
The record protocol can operate 
without a MAC, but is generally 
only used in this mode while 
another protocol uses the record 
protocol as transport for 
negotiating security parameters. 
While the TLS record protocol is used 
for encapsulation of various higher 
level protocols, the TLS handshake 
protocol allows the server and client to 
authenticate each other and to 
negotiate an encryption algorithm and 
cryptographic keys before the 
application protocol transmits or 
receives its first byte of data. The TLS 
handshake protocol provides 
connection security that has the 
following properties:  
1. The peer’s identity can be 
identified using symmetric or 
public key cryptography. 
2. The negotiation of the shared secret 
is secure. 
3. The negotiation is reliable in that 
no attacker can modify the 
negotiation without being detected 
by the communicating parties. 
EPA-TLS is considered as the best 
available (security wise) authentication 
method for WLANs but the main 
concern with this method is that it 
requires Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) because it uses a digital 
certificate to authenticate the server to 
the client; the server requires the client 
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to send it a digital certificate if it 
wishes to authenticate the client. 
 TTLS: To overcome complications 
associated with the use of PKI in the 
client, tunnelled transport layer 
security (TTLS) was developed. 
With TTLS, server site certificates are 
required. As the one of the few 
currently available tunnelling 
authentication methods, TTLS is a two 
step authentication method, in the first 
step, an asymmetric algorithm based 
on server keys is used to verify the 
server’s identity and set up a 
symmetric encryption tunnel. 
The second step involves verifying the 
client’s identity by using a second 
authentication method through the 
symmetric encryption tunnel for the 
actual authentication negotiation. The 
second authentication method used 
within the tunnel may by an EAP type 
(often MD5) or a legacy method such 
as PAP. 
The symmetric encryption tunnel of 
TTLS is used only for protecting the 
authentication method, therefore, once 
verified the encryption tunnel collapses 
and it is up to the client and the server 
to create a WEP encryption tunnel for 
on-going data confidentiality. 
 EAP-TTLS offers strong security 
during authentication while 
accommodating existing end-user 
working methods (user ID/password), 
thus avoiding the complexities of PKI 
in the client’s site. 
 PEAP: Protected EAP (PEAP) is an 
authentication type that is designed to 
allow hybrid authentication. While for 
server-side authentication PEAP 
employs PKI, for client-side 
authentication, PEAP can use any 
other EAP authentication type. But 
unlike TTLS, legacy methods are not 
supported for the client authentication 
step. There is an EAP-MS CHAP v2 
implementation, but this is 
incompatible with older RADIUS 
servers that do not provide EAP 
support. Because PEAP establishes a 
secure tunnel via server-side 
authentication, non-mutually 
authenticating EAP types can be used 
for client-side authentication. (Cisco 
Systems, 2002). 
PEAP is based on server-side EAP-
TLS, and it addresses the 
manageability and scalability 
shortcomings of EAP-TLS. 
Organisations can avoid the issues 
associated with installing digital 
certificates on every client machine as 
required by EAP-TLS and select the 
method of client authentication that 
best suits them. 
 
4. Selection factors 
This paper provides algorithms that 
guide the selection of an EAP-
authentication method for a WLAN. 
The first step in achieving this is the 
identification of factors upon which the 
selection decision will depend. 
Recalling that different authentication 
methods have different security 
capabilities, and provide organisations 
with different levels of protection, the 
degree of protection provided by 
different authentication methods is the 
first factor to be considered. 
The level of protection provided by a 
certain authentication method depends 
on: 
• Authentication method’s 
implementation technique 
• Authentication attribute: mutual or 
unilateral 
Recalling that all EAP-authentication 
methods (except MD5, which is not 
recommended for WLANs and is 
therefore not considered) provide 
mutual authentication, then the 
decisive factor when comparing the 
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level of protection provided by 
different authentication methods will 
be their implementation technique. 
It is very important to understand the 
difference between the protection level 
provided by authentication methods 
and the protection level required by 
organisations. These are two totally 
different concepts while the former 
depends only on the implementation 
technique used the latter depends on 
the security risks and possible attacks 
in a certain environment as well as the 
business reasons for deploying 
WLANs.  
The vulnerability of a WLAN in a 
specific environment, that is the 
security threats and possible attacks in 
that environment, is the second factor 
to be considered in the authentication 
method selection process. 
The third factor comes from the fact 
that the basic pre-requisite to employ 
any of these methods is the existence 
of a supportive network infrastructure 
or the possibility to upgrade it to meet 
the requirements of the authentication 
method that is capable of providing the 
required protection. 
A supportive network infrastructure 
includes all the hardware, software and 
firmware components required by a 
certain authentication method. 
Different authentication methods 
depending on their implementation 
technique require different WLAN 
infrastructure. While the deployment 
of TLS requires the existence of public 
key (PKI) infrastructure, LEAP 
requires Cisco products or Cisco 
compatible exchange program (CCX) 
for non-Cisco infrastructure. Clearly, if 
the existing infrastructure does not 
support the IEEE 802.1X 
authentication frame, or upgrading the 
existing infrastructure to meet the 
requirements of the authentication 
frame is unacceptable, there is no point 
considering the deployment of EAP-
authentication methods. 
Finally, as with any other such 
selection procedure, the cost of 
implementing a particular 
authentication method cannot be 
ignored. 
The authentication method’s 
implementation cost always includes 
the cost of any infrastructure upgrade 
required to implement the method as 
well as the cost associated with 
upgrading the knowledge and skills of 
the users of the WLAN clients to a 
level that enables them to use the 
newly implemented authentication 
method without difficulties.  
From the above discussion and the fact 
that each of the authentication methods 
is implemented using a different 
technique (password-based, certificate-
based, and tunnelling), the 
implementation costs of different 
authentication methods will vary. Not 
only that but the implementation cost 
for the same authentication method in 
different networking environments will 
be different depending on the existing 
WLAN infrastructure.  
Crucial is the ability of organisations 
or WLAN customers to meet the 
implementation cost imposed by the 
authentication method that can provide 
them with the desired level of 
protection.  If that is not the case they 
might still be able to select another 
authentication method that is 
compatible with their budget, but it 
might not be strong enough to provide 
the desired level of security. Clearly, in 
cases where the organisation’s 
emphasis is on security there is no 
point in implementing any 
authentication method that is not 
capable of providing the required level 
of security. 
It is obvious that there is a strong 
relationship between the selection 
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factors, each of them having a great 
impact on the other factors and the 
selection process itself. For example, if 
the selected authentication method is 
not supported by the existing WLAN 
infrastructure, then there is a need to 
upgrade it, which means additional 
implementation costs. If an upgrade is 
unacceptable then the second best 
authentication method that is supported 
by the existing infrastructure has to be 
selected, but it might not be strong 
enough to provide the desired degree 
of protection. 
The implementation cost can be very 
high or very low (in some cases the 
most secure solution can be 
implemented without any significant 
cost) depending on the existing 
infrastructure and the requirements of a 
particular organisation in terms of the 
desired level of security. 
There are other less important factors, 
which will not be considered in this 
paper, such as deployment difficulties, 
and the complexity of administration 
and management, etc.  
Due to the following facts the selection 
of the most suitable authentication 
method is a very difficult process: 
• The selection of the most suitable 
authentication method does not depend 
on one factor rather it depends on 
many factors, which are related and 
contradictory.  
• Based on the fact that different 
authentication methods require 
different supportive infrastructure, the 
authentication method’s 
implementation cost will be different 
for different authentication methods. 
• Different authentication methods are 
vulnerable to different types of security 
threats and attacks. 
• The security level desired by a 
certain organisation in a specific 
environment depends not only on the 
authentication method used but also on 
the networking environment and the 
value and importance of the 
applications and information hosted by 
the WLAN and the business reasons 
for deploying WLANs. 
 
5. EAP Method Selection Algorithms 
To provide organisations and WLANs 
customers with the most suitable 
authentication solution for their 
security needs and specific networking 
environments, EAP authentication 
method selection algorithms have been 
developed that are presented in this 
paper.  
The reasons that contributed to the 
need for these algorithms can be 
summarised as follows: 
• IEEE 802 standards do not define 
the upper layer authentication 
scheme instead they leave the 
choice of this scheme to the system 
implementers. 
• The IEEE 802.1X authentication 
frame supports a variety of 
authentication methods each with 
different benefits and drawbacks. 
Any one of these methods might be 
an ideal choice in certain 
environments. 
• Due to the range of WLAN 
applications a single authentication 
method could not be suitable for all 
WLANs. 
• Different authentication methods 
have different security capabilities 
and require different supportive 
infrastructure. 
 Firstly, selection algorithms will be 
developed based on each one of the 
selection factors identified in the 
previous section separately and later 
the main selection algorithm will be 
constructed by considering all these 
factors together.  
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Based on the discussion in the previous 
section, the selection algorithms will 
adhere to the following assumptions: 
• The selection algorithms must 
provide organisations with the 
authentication method that suits 
their security requirements with 
the minimum implementation cost. 
• The security (protection) level 
desired by organisations is the 
most important factor to be 
considered in the selection process. 
• The authentication method’s 
implementation cost is associated 
with any infrastructure upgrade 
required.  
• If the existing infrastructure 
supports the implementation of the 
most secure authentication method 
there is no other factor to be 
considered since there will not be 
any significant additional costs 
associated with the authentication 
method’s implementation. 
The selection of the most suitable 
authentication method, based only on 
the provided degree of security, is a 
one-step process that involves the 
identification of the degree of 
protection provided by different 
authentication methods.  
The selection algorithm is shown in 
Figure 1 and an explanation of how it 
works follows.  
 If an organisation’s emphasis is on the 
most secure solution regardless of 
other factors such as the existing 
network infrastructure then TLS 
represents the best available option. 
However, if the organisation is not 
prepared for any reason to deal with 
the complexities associated with the 
use of digital certificates on the client’s 
sites, or it does not require the level of 
security provided by TLS, then it has 
to consider employing one of the 
tunnelled methods. The most suitable 
tunnelled method to employ depends 
on the organisation’s approach to 
authenticating its WLAN clients. 
Finally, if the organisation does not 
require the level of security provided 
by the above-mentioned methods then 
LEAP is the only available option. 
This algorithm is simple and easy to 
use. However, the problem with this 
algorithm is that it selects the most 
secure solution based not on the 
vulnerabilities of the environment (the 
desired degree of protection) but on the 
authentication method’s 
implementation technique (the 
provided level of protection).   
The selection algorithm based only on 
the security threats is the most 
important one factor based algorithm 
because it identifies the desired level 
of security in a specific networking 
environment. 
The most demanding step of this 
algorithm is the identification of the 
security threats. Once these threats and 
attacks are identified it is quite easy to 
select the authentication method that is 
capable of providing the required level 
of security.  
The identification of the desired level 
of security depends on the security 
threats, the importance and value of the 
applications and information hosted by 
the WLAN, and the business reasons 
for deploying the WLAN. The 
selection algorithm is shown in Figure 
2 and an explanation of how it works 
follows. 
In networking environments where 
MITM and dictionary attacks are 
possible threats then the only available 
solution is to deploy TLS. However, if 
the protection needed is only against 
dictionary attacks then depending on 
the network infrastructure and 
implementation cost organisations can 
select TTLS, PEAP or TLS. 
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On the other hand, if there is a threat of 
MITM attacks but not dictionary 
attacks, then LEAP or TLS must be 
considered. 
In cases where the organisation’s 
emphasis is on hiding its clients’ 
identities then any one of the tunnelled 
methods must be considered. The most 
suitable tunnelled method to deploy 
depends on the organisation’s 
approach to authenticating its clients. 
The basic advantage of this algorithm 
is its ability to identify the 
authentication method that is capable 
of securing the network against the 
identified security threats. However, in 
some cases the implementation cost 
may be very high. 
The third selection algorithm is based 
only on the existing network 
infrastructure, other factors are not 
considered. 
With this algorithm the selection 
process begins by investigating the 
existing WLAN infrastructure and then 
selecting the most secure 
authentication method that is supported 
by it. The selection algorithm is shown 
in Figure 3 and an explanation of how 
it works follows. 
If upgrading the infrastructure to 
implement an EAP-authentication 
method is unacceptable then the 
following decision process applies. If 
the existing network infrastructure 
supports IEEE 802.1X and digital 
certificates are already in use by other 
applications then TLS would be the 
ideal choice since it would secure the 
WLAN with the strongest available 
authentication method without any 
additional costs. But if that is not the 
case and the existing infrastructure 
only supports server side certificates 
then based on the approach the 
organisation adopts to authenticating 
its WLAN clients, one of the tunnelled 
methods can be implemented. On the 
other hand, if the infrastructure 
supports the IEEE 802.1X 
authentication framework but does not 
support the use of digital certificates 
for either of the communicating parties, 
then the organisation is left with the 
last available authentication option, 
which is LEAP. It is obvious that if 
there is no 802.1X supportive 
infrastructure it is pointless to consider 
the deployment of EAP authentication 
methods. 
The basic advantage of using this 
algorithm is that it identifies 
authentication methods that do not 
require any additional infrastructure 
expenditure. However, it has a major 
disadvantage which is its inability to 
identify in some cases the 
authentication method that is strong 
enough to provide the desired level of 
protection. 
This algorithm can be used by 
organisations with limited financial 
resources or those that want to keep 
their existing infrastructure. 
In the selection algorithm based on 
implementation cost, the selection 
process begins by assessing the budget 
available for authentication method 
implementation and then selecting the 
most secure authentication solution 
that can be implemented within the 
available budget. In the selection 
algorithm shown in Figure 4  the 
decisive factor is the ability of the 
organisation to match the 
implementation costs imposed by the 
authentication methods. An 
explanation of how it works follows. 
If the authentication method’s 
implementation cost in terms of 
infrastructure spending is not an issue, 
then TLS is recommended.  
Nevertheless, if the organisation is 
looking for strong authentication 
methods without the additional costs 
that come with the implementation of 
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client side certificates then tunnelled 
methods represent an adequate solution. 
The preference for one of the tunnelled 
methods compared to the others 
depends on the organisation’s 
requirements to employ legacy or EAP 
methods to authenticate WLAN clients. 
3. The components of the 
infrastructure that is required to 
support the implementation of the 
selected authentication method 
must be identified. 
4. If there is a need to upgrade the 
infrastructure then the 
implementation cost must be 
considered. 
However, if the organisation is not 
prepared to employ tunnelled methods 
or if the network is based on Cisco 
WLAN infrastructure then LEAP 
represents the only available option.  
5. If the upgrade cost is unacceptable 
then the next best authentication 
method must be selected. 
The major benefit of using this 
algorithm comes from its ability to 
identify the strongest possible 
authentication method that is 
compatible with the available budget. 
However, its disadvantage is that in 
some cases it might not identify the 
authentication method that provides 
the desired level of protection. This 
algorithm can be used by organisations 
that want to secure their WLANs 
within an available budget. 
6. Repeat steps 3 to 5 until the 
authentication method that suits the 
particular environment is obtained. 
The process of searching for an 
authentication method that is 
compatible with a certain environment 
is not endless. The number of available 
authentication methods limits it.  
The main selection algorithm begins 
by investigating the existing network 
infrastructure and identifying security 
threats, see Figure 5. To overcome the shortcomings 
associated with the one factor based 
selection algorithms presented in this 
paper, the main selection algorithm of 
this paper was developed. This 
algorithm is constructed by 
considering all the factors previously 
addressed together, namely, the 
provided level of protection, the 
desired security level, the existing 
network infrastructure, and the 
implementation cost. The security level 
required by an organisation is 
considered to be the most important 
factor then the other factors are 
considered together. In the selection 
process the following steps must be 
performed: 
If the organisation’s emphasis is on 
protecting its clients identities then 
depending on the existing network 
infrastructure one of the tunnelled 
methods should be deployed. However, 
if the emphasis in not on protecting 
client identities and digital certificates 
are already in use by other applications 
then TLS provides the most secure 
solution. 
In environments where protection 
against dictionary attacks is needed 
then either TLS or one of the tunnelled 
methods must be considered. On the 
other hand, if there is a risk of MITM 
attacks then depending on the network 
infrastructure and the implementation 
cost LEAP or TLS must be employed. 1. The desired level of security must 
be identified. 
In environments where the threats 
include both MITM and dictionary 
attacks, the only available solution is 
TLS. 
2. The authentication method that is 
capable of providing the desired 
level of security must be identified. 
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 The main advantage of this algorithm 
is that it can, for different organisations 
in different environments, identify the 
most suitable authentication methods 
with the minimum possible additional 
costs.  
   
6. Examples of the Application of the 
Selection Algorithms 
To demonstrate the applicability of the 
selection algorithms, in the following, 
they are applied in three different 
scenarios with different security 
requirements and different networking 
environments, and shown to deliver 
sensible results. 
Example 1 
The following scenario was taken from 
http://www.microsoft.com/india/casest
udies/patniwireless.aspx on 09/12/05. 
“Patni Computer Systems Limited is a 
global IT services provider with 2003 
revenues of US $251 million. 
Employing over 7,000 people globally, 
Patni operates multiple offshore 
development centers across 6 cities in 
India and 22 international offices 
across the Americas, Europe and Asia-
Pacific. Patni’s senior management is 
on the move constantly from one 
meeting to another. To give its 
managers more flexibility and freedom 
from wires and being tied to a 
particular location, the IT team decided 
to implement a wireless Local Area 
Network (WLAN)”. 
 “Patni wanted to have network access 
without the hassle of wires, network 
ports and multiple logons. At the same 
time Patni wanted to make sure it 
would be implementing a solution that 
did not compromise on security, 
offered flawless connectivity and ease 
of manageability”. 
In late 2003 Patni implemented 
wireless LAN using the WLAN 
networking support provided in 
Windows XP and Windows 2000 
Server. 
 “The solution adopted by Patni was a 
WLAN Implementation using an ISA 
Server, Digital Certificates and Group 
Policies. The IS department at Patni 
began by upgrading its laptops to 
wireless compatible technologies. 
Patni uses access points from Cisco 
and WLAN adapters from multiple 
vendors namely Cisco, Intel, 3Com 
etc”. 
“During the evaluation phase, Patni 
worked closely with the Microsoft 
technical team to understand the 
implementation process, architecture 
and built-in security options. Based on 
the understanding gained, the company 
implemented the Internet 
Authentication Server for 
authenticating client credentials”. 
“The implementation was carried out 
completely by the IT team at Patni. 
Multiple Access Points from Cisco 
were used to provide the best possible 
coverage. All access points were 
configured to authenticate users using 
the 802.1X / TLS authentication. 
Internet Authentication Server from 
Microsoft was used as the RADIUS 
Server”.  
Solution Provided by Applying the 
Selection Algorithms 
The fact that Patni implemented 
Wireless LAN using the WLAN 
networking Support provided in 
Windows XP and Windows 2000 
Server and the fact that Windows XP 
and Windows 2000 Server both 
support TLS which is strongest 
available authentication method 
together with Patni’s emphasis on 
strong security will be used as the 
input data for the selection algorithms.  
First, the main selection algorithm will 
be applied and then the selection 
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algorithm based on the existing 
infrastructure. 
At this point the main selection 
algorithm, based on the fact that both 
operating systems (Windows XP and 
Windows 2000 Server) support EAP-
TLS, will identify EAP-TLS as the 
authentication method that best suits 
this environment. 
The most suitable authentication 
method that will be identified by the 
selection algorithms must meet Patni’s 
requirements, which are mentioned 
above (their security needs and 
networking environment), otherwise 
the applicability of these algorithms 
will be questionable. 
TLS in this particular case can be 
implemented without any significant 
implementation cost and at the same 
time provide the most secure solution. The applicability of the selection 
algorithms will be judged by 
comparing their output, namely, the 
authentication methods they identify as 
the most suitable solution, with the 
authentication method that was 
selected by Patni. If the selection 
algorithms identify the same 
authentication method as that adopted 
by Patni then this result supports their 
applicability. 
In only two steps the main selection 
algorithm, by identifying TLS as the 
solution that best suits Patni’s 
requirements, confirms the correctness 
of the decision made by Microsoft and 
Patni.  
The same result is obtained if the 
selection algorithm based only on the 
existing infrastructure is applied. 
Example 2 Patni’s IT team with the support 
provided by Microsoft Co. selected 
EAP-TLS as the best solution for their 
networking environments and security 
needs. 
The following scenario was taken from 
http://store.mtghouse.com/newWeb/cgi
bin/case_study_cal_poly_ponoma.asp 
on 07/12/05. 
“The Southern Polytechnic State 
University, Marietta, Georgia (SPSU) 
has a student body composed of 
approximately 3700 students, about 
one-third of which are non-traditional 
and attend evening or weekend classes. 
SPSU has approximately 800 resident 
students, but the majority of the 
student body resides off campus. SPSU 
students, staff and faculty wanted a 
wireless LAN service and the mobile 
Internet access it could provide”.  
The main selection algorithm in its 
attempt to provide this WLAN with the 
most suitable authentication method 
begins by investigating the existing 
infrastructure, if it is not compatible 
with IEEE 802.1X (which is not the 
case with Patni’s infrastructure), then 
there is no point considering 
employing any of the authentication 
methods since one of Paatni’s main 
requirements is to employ the 
authentication method using the 
wireless network support provided in 
Windows XP and Windows 2000 
Server. 
“SPSU's Information Technology 
Division wanted to implement a 
campus-wide wireless LAN that would 
augment its existing 802.11 Ethernet 
wired network. Discussions with 
SPSU's primary networking hardware 
vendor, Enterasys Networks, led it to 
consider 802.1X-based solutions”.  
By checking Patni’s existing 
infrastructure it will be found that it 
does support IEEE 802.1X.  
The next step (see the main selection 
algorithm) is to identify the 
authentication methods that suit the 
organisation’s security requirements.  
 Cross-platform support was also a 
critical need due to a lack of user 
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platform control that is typical of 
universities.  
 “The majority of SPSU's servers and a 
considerable portion of its clients run 
the Linux operating system. In addition 
to Linux support SPSU required 
security/authentication solutions for 
Mac OS X and the Microsoft PC 
operating systems, both in wired and 
wireless configurations”. 
 “The client solution would have to be 
a standard 802.1X implementation and 
interoperable with SPSU's Funk Steel 
Belted RADIUS running on Solaris 
and its open LDAP directory on the 
back end”.  
 “SPSU decided to use EAP-TTLS, a 
tunnelled EAP method offering 
especially strong security, but which 
did not require the resource burden of 
EAP-TLS. EAP-TTLS offers a 
comparable level of security without 
the need to deploy and maintain client 
certificates”. 
 “Meetinghouse provided a LINUX 
solution, plus cross-platform support 
covering Mac OS X and Microsoft 
operating systems. The AEGIS Client 
solution is a standard implementation 
of 802.1X and fully compatible with 
SPSU's Steel Belted RADIUS server. 
In addition, it supports the TTLS 
tunnelled EAP method and mutual 
authentication”. 
“SPSU is rolling-out a campus-wide 
WLAN first covering those areas with 
highest user demand. SPSU will 
implement significant coverage in the 
future. The present deployment 
indicates it has met its goals for strong 
security/authentication”.  
 
Solution Provided by Applying the 
Selection Algorithms 
 
To apply the selection algorithms to 
the case of SPSU its security and 
networking environment requirements 
have first to be identified. These are: 
 
1) A secure networking 
environment. 
2) Strong authentication without 
the need to deploy PKI 
infrastructure. 
3) The authentication method 
must be supported by Microsoft, 
Linux, Apple Mackintosh, and 
other platforms used by the 
staff and the student body.  
 
The main selection algorithm, after 
investigating the compatibility of the 
SPSU network infrastructure with the 
requirements of IEEE 802.1X and 
based on the fact that SPSU decided to 
employ an EAP method that provides 
strong security, but which does not 
require the resource burden of EAP-
TLS identifies PEAP and TTLS as the 
best available options. The choice 
between them depends on SPSU’s 
approach to authenticating its students 
and staff, in other words whether 
students and staff machines support 
only EAP authentication methods or 
EAP and legacy methods.  
It is known that while PEAP supports 
only EAP methods for client 
authentication, TTLS in addition to 
supporting EAP methods also supports 
legacy methods. 
Because various operating systems are 
used in different machines there is no 
guarantee that all machines will 
support EAP. Therefore, the main 
selection algorithm identifies TTLS as 
the solution that suits this environment 
because it is the only available 
authentication method that supports 
EAP as well as legacy methods. This 
means that regardless of the students’ 
machines operating systems students 
using different platforms can access 
the network. At the same time, EAP-
TTLS without any significant 
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additional costs offers a strong 
authentication level that is comparable 
with the level of security provided by 
the most secure solution (TLS) without 
the need to deploy and maintain client 
certificates. 
The selection algorithm in only three 
steps confirms the correctness of the 
decision made by the Meetinghouse 
and SPSU to select EAP-TTLS as the 
authentication method that best suits 
the security needs and networking 
environment of SPSU. EAP-TLLS is 
also identified if the selection 
algorithm based on the existing 
infrastructure is used or if the 
algorithm based on the upgrade 
strategy is used. 
Example 3 
The following scenario was taken from 
www.Cisco.com  on 11/12/05. 
Cisco uses its own technology within 
its corporate network whenever 
possible. In the case of wireless 
technology, Cisco employs Cisco 
Aironet access points using the Cisco 
Wireless Security Suite to implement 
Cisco LEAP and pre-standard TKIP 
for secure authentication and 
encryption of all WLAN 
communication. Cisco Secure ACS is 
used to provide the RADIUS services 
required for LEAP. To provide some 
background and an example of a 
functioning Cisco Secure ACS 
deployment with Aironet wireless 
products, a brief discussion follows of 
how Cisco has implemented Cisco 
Secure ACS and Aironet products in 
its network. 
“At the Cisco main campus in San Jose, 
CA buildings are grouped into three 
segments. Each segment consists of 6 
to 19 buildings and all the buildings in 
the segment are on a common LAN. 
Each building has six to eight WLAN 
access points per floor and all the 
access points in each building are on 
their own dedicated VLAN. All inter-
building and inter-segment network 
connections use one-gigabyte fiber 
optic technology. Other Cisco 
campuses are similarly configured. All 
wireless connections are designated as 
secondary network access. Primary 
network access is through switch ports 
over wired Ethernet”. 
“Cisco Secure ACS is used to provide 
LEAP authentication for the access 
points, and is configured to use 
Microsoft Active Directory for 
external database authentication. One 
Cisco Secure ACS is deployed for each 
segment of 6 to 19 buildings. A Cisco 
LocalDirector content switch is placed 
before each Cisco Secure ACS for load 
balancing and failover. All Aironet 
access points are configured with one 
RADIUS server and the LocalDirector 
content switch is used for failover. The 
LocalDirector is used because of the 
way the deployed version of access 
point software handles RADIUS 
failover. As a result, Cisco is not 
currently using accounting on its 
wireless network”.  
Solution Provided by Applying the 
Selection Algorithms 
LEAP was developed by Cisco mainly 
to be used on Cisco wireless products 
as the first commercial and practical 
EAP authentication solution. 
Consequently, one of the main 
problems with LEAP deployment is 
that it requires a Cisco products based 
infrastructure, or if it has to be used 
with non-Cisco products, Cisco 
compatible exchange program (CCX) 
must be installed, which means 
additional costs and additional 
configuration and management effort. 
When it comes to Cisco’s WLAN, 
there is no doubt that Cisco uses its 
own technology, in other words the 
infrastructure is Cisco products based. 
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It is obvious that the selection in this 
case will be based mainly on the 
existing infrastructure.  
If the selection algorithm based on the 
existing infrastructure was applied (at 
the time when Cisco selected LEAP), 
LEAP will be identified as the best 
possible solution. 
This confirms the applicability of the 
selection algorithms, but the 
interesting thing is that if the same 
algorithm were applied today it would 
most probably not identify LEAP. It 
might identify PEAP, which was not 
developed at the time Cisco 
implemented LEAP. 
After Cisco adopted LEAP as their 
authentication solution a long time 
passed before Microsoft PEAP was 
developed to address security problems 
associated with LEAP; mainly related 
to dictionary attacks. 
There is no doubt PEAP is better than 
LEAP and Cisco will probably upgrade 
its authentication mechanism if it has 
not yet already done so. 
Cisco has developed a new 
authentication method known as 
flexible authentication via secure 
tunnelling (FAST). However, this 
paper does not address FAST because 
it is not yet widely deployed. 
The above examples demonstrate the 
efficiency and usefulness of the 
selection algorithms proposed in this 
paper.  
 
7. Managerial Implications 
Selecting the most suitable 
authentication method is a big step 
towards securing a WLAN. But it does 
not mean the WLAN is secure and the 
authentication related risks are 
completely eliminated. In order for the 
selected authentication method to be 
effective it must be looked at on an 
ongoing basis. This means WLAN 
managers must take further steps and 
follow well-defined routines that 
ensure the selected authentication 
method maintains the required level of 
protection. 
In this section remembering the 
information security 80/20 rule which 
is that 80 percent of exploit risks can 
be effectively reduced using 20 percent 
of the recommended security 
procedures and steps 
(www.8020info.com/principle.html), 
the most fundamental aspects and best 
practices of securing WLANs will be 
identified. 
1) Education and Training: To reduce 
the flaws in WLAN security that 
can result from human errors and 
omissions or as the result of users’ 
limited knowledge of WLAN 
security threats and risks, education 
and training for all WLAN users 
and managers is absolutely 
essential no matter how good and 
secure the selected upper-layer 
authentication method is. On the 
other hand, providing such training 
or education means additional costs 
on top of the selected 
authentication method’s 
implementation costs. Thus, there 
is trade-off and WLAN managers 
need to carefully balance the 
importance of maintaining the 
required level of security with the 
ability of WLAN organisations to 
match these additional expenses. 
2) Product Selection: There exists a 
wide range of authentication 
solution products, so the question 
is which ones to select and how to 
manage the selected products 
successfully? Bearing in mind the 
natural tendency towards ease of 
deployment and management, only 
Wi-Fi certified products that ensure 
interoperability should be selected. 
On the other hand, the right 
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selection of the required products 
(hardware, software and firmware) 
helps to integrate wireless LANs 
with existing wired networks 
(www.theregister.co.uk).  
3) Site Survey (SS): The SS is a very 
important factor in the success of 
the WLAN implementation. A 
great deal of information can be 
obtained from a SS, such as the 
number of APs required, the 
coverage and bandwidth 
performance at different locations. 
Even more important is how the SS 
information is analyzed to support 
important implementation issues 
such as security, interference, etc. 
(M. Gast, 2005). 
In addition to these points there are 
other issues that should be considered 
by WLAN managers such as the 
instructions and recommendations 
provided by WLAN vendors. 
(www.wi.fiplanet.com/tutorials/articles
.php/985421).  
 
8. Conclusions             
This paper provides algorithms for the 
selection of an EAP authentication 
method for a WLAN, the effectiveness 
and efficiency of which have been 
demonstrated through three examples 
taken from real scenarios. 
Although one factor-based selection 
algorithms are simple and may turn out 
to be powerful in some cases, their 
drawbacks restrict their application to 
certain environments and specific 
requirements. 
The main selection algorithm of this 
paper, by considering several selection 
factors together, addresses 
shortcomings of one factor-based 
selection algorithms and is capable of 
providing the most suitable 
authentication method for different 
organisations in different environments 
with different requirements. 
This algorithm guides the 
authentication method selection 
process for a specific organisation by 
identifying the security level desired in 
that environment as well as 
investigating the existing network 
infrastructure and the possibility of 
upgrading it to meet the requirements 
imposed by a particular authentication 
method.  
The major advantage of the main 
selection algorithm is its ability to 
balance the threat, information value, 
and costs in the process of the selection 
of the most suitable authentication 
method. 
The most interesting feature of the 
algorithms presented in this paper, 
besides their potential to identify the 
most suitable solution for an 
organisation’s requirements, is their 
flexibility and scalability. The 
algorithms can easily be reconstructed 
to address selection factors that are not 
considered in this paper such as 
deployment difficulties and 
administration and management effort. 
Also these algorithms with little 
modification can accommodate 
additional authentication methods that 
are not addressed in this paper 
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Figure 1: EAP Authentication Method Selection Algorithm Based on Security Level 
provided
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
Yes 
No 
Yes Protection 
against MITM 
attack only? 
Use LEAP or TLS 
Yes
Protection against 
MITM & 
dictionary attack? 
Use TLS 
Protection 
against 
dictionary 
attack only? 
Identify possible security   attacks 
and threats 
Use TTL, PEAP 
or TLS 
           START 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Protection of 
communicating 
parties identity? 
Legacy 
methods 
for clients? 
Use 
PEAP 
Figure 2: EAP Authentication Method Selection Algorithm 
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Figure 3: EAP Authentication Method Selection Algorithm Based on Existing 
Network Infrastructure 
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Figure 4: EAP Authentication Method Selection Algorithm Based on Upgrade 
Strategy 
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Figure 5: Main Algorithm for EAP Authentication Method Selection  
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Property 
 
 
MD5 
 
LEAP 
 
TLS 
 
TTLS 
 
PEAP 
Implementation Challenge Password Certificate Server 
Side 
Certificate 
Server 
Side 
Certificate
Based  Based Based 
 
Authentication Unilateral Mutual Mutual Mutual Mutual 
Attributes 
 
Deployment  Easy Easy Hard Moderate Moderate 
Difficulties 
 
Dynamic No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Re-keying 
 
Requires 
Server 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Certificate 
 
Requires Client No No Yes No No 
Certificate 
 
Tunnelled No No No Yes Yes 
 
WPA 
Compatible 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
WLAN 
Security 
Poor Moderate Strongest Strong Strong 
 
 
Security Identity 
exposed, 
Dictionary 
attack, 
MITM 
attack. 
Identity 
exposed, 
Dictionary 
attack. 
Identity 
exposed. 
MITM 
attack. 
MITM 
attack. 
Identity 
hidden in 
phase2 
but 
potential 
exposure 
in Phase1. 
Risks 
 
 
             Table 1: Properties of EAP Authentication Methods.  
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